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Introduction
THE RECENT international fi nancial CRISIS, which begun in the middle of 2007 with the elevation of the default on the high risk mortgages (subprime) in the United States, assumed systemic outlines with Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 2008. Its refl exes were felt in the whole world, 
raising successive public interventions in order to guarantee the bank solvency 
and to lessen the recessive impacts of the abrupt reduction of the credit. But it has 
equally renewed the discussion on the “fi nancialized” character of the operations 
performed by remarkably productive companies, which took advantage of 
extremely complex instruments in the search for supplemental earnings resulting 
from the fi nancial leverage.
In this crisis, the search for high fi nancial earnings showed its 
consequences in a more overwhelming way, on what concerns both the risks (and 
losses) to which the corporations were exposed and the macroeconomic impacts 
provoked by its magnitude in a context of deep risk aversion. Such debate, in 
spite of still incipient, began with the disclosure of the negative results of several 
productive companies from emerging economies, resulting from operations 
with fi nancial derivatives in the exchange market. Based on what is known in 
the moment, that process reached companies in Brazil, China, South Korea, 
India, and Mexico. In those emerging economies, in different degrees, the great 
international banks are present and many of those companies alleged they have 
been deceived by them in establishing asymmetrical contracts of derivatives. 
In Brazil, national fi nancial institutions also participated in the movement, 
differently, for instance, of Mexico, whose banking sector is dominated by 
international players.
The article seeks to evaluate the interrelations, in the emerging economies, 
between the operations with instruments of fi nancial derivatives, the speculation 
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process and the current crisis. It was subdivided in two sections, in addition to 
this introduction and the fi nal considerations. In the fi rst section, the concepts 
of hedge, speculation and arbitrage are presented. The potential risks resulting 
from the “fi nancialized” and speculative structure of the companies in the use 
of derivatives are explored as well. In the second section, some cases of losses 
detected by the companies operating in those markets are studied, as well as their 
macroeconomic impacts and their developments on the emerging economies, 
more specifi cally on the exchange rate, the credit squeeze and the risk perception. 
In the fi nal considerations, the intensifi cation of the process of “fi nancialization” 
of the companies and the importance of new mechanisms for the regulation and 
supervision of those markets are pointed out.
Hedge, Arbitrage, Speculation and the Derivatives Markets
With the end of the Bretton Woods agreements and the largest volatility 
of the interests and of the exchange rates, fi nancial derivatives have been created 
with the initial purpose of covering risks. However, the use of those mechanisms 
was not restricted to that purpose, becoming a privileged instrument of 
speculation, given the possibility of high capital gains. Thus, it is necessary to 
differentiate and to understand the concepts of hedge, arbitrage and speculation, 
in face of the existence of derivatives markets, in which the companies have 
leveraged their positions.
In the fi rst place, we should try to defi ne what a derivative is. According 
to Dodd & Griffi th-Jones (2007, p. 13), “a derivative is a fi nancial contract 
whose value is derived from an underlying asset or commodity price, an index, 
rate or event. They commonly go by names such as forward, future, option, 
and swap, and they are often embedded in hybrid or structured securities.” The 
characteristic of this set of derivatives is to negotiate, in the present, the future 
value of an asset. For that to happen, an agreement between the buyer and the 
seller is required. For that reason, the derivatives markets constitute a zero sum 
game, in which the amounts lost by some correspond exactly to the ones earned 
by others, with the exception of transaction costs.
According to Guttmann (2008, pp. 20-1), the derivatives instruments 
“helped to reduce the different risk types associated to the fi nances, and they 
served as excellent speculation tools as well.” As a matter of fact, derivatives are 
highly leveraged mechanisms that allow multiplying the size both of the losses 
and of the possible earnings in relation to the initial capital. In the derivatives 
markets, small initial margins or guarantee deposits make possible to operate 
immense amounts. The percentage results can be spectacular, working as 
supplemental factor of attraction for the speculators that can see their initial 
investment multiply several folds, which would be practically impossible if they 
operated in the spot markets. The counterpoint to those advantages is that the 
potential losses can be theoretically unlimited in some of those operations and it 
is not always possible to measure them beforehand.
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Saxena & Villar (2008, p. 72) discuss the extension of the use of hedge 
instruments in markets of emerging economies, pointing out the importance of 
the derivatives:
Hedging took a gigantic step forward with the development of derivative 
products in global fi nancial markets. The growth in depth and breadth of these 
markets has made derivatives one of the most important instruments to trade risk 
in fi nancial markets.
The authors, however, do not emphasize the speculative application of 
derivatives in the operations of fi nancial or non-fi nancial agents. In spite of this, 
they observe that
the non-fi nancial corporate sector has a relatively greater share of more complex 
and long-lived FX derivatives. There are many opportunities for the use of FX 
derivatives to increase among the corporate non-fi nancial sector in many EMEs. 
However, even in advanced economies the corporate non-fi nancial sector does 
not hedge a great deal of the risks in their balance sheet in the derivatives market. 
(ibidem, p. 77)
In that sense, it is important to explore some differences between the 
concepts of hedge and those of speculation in fi nancial markets that make wide 
use of derivatives. According to Farhi (1999, pp. 94-5),
the operations of risk coverage (hedge) consist, essentially, in assuming, for a 
future time, the opposite position to the one that is assumed in the spot market. 
[...] both the industrial that has a debt in foreign currency and buys foreign 
exchange contracts in the future market or acquires call options, and the investor 
that will receive an amount of money in a given term and buys contracts of index 
of values are performing a buy hedge, although their positions in the spot market 
in the moment of the operations are different.
In its turn, speculation can be seen as “the liquid positions, long or short, 
in a market of fi nancial assets (spot or of derivatives) without coverage for an 
opposite position in the market with another temporality in the same assets, or in 
an effectively correlated asset.”
It is the fact that some positions are maintained liquid, without coverage by an 
opposite position in another temporality, and in the same asset or in a correlate 
asset, which characterizes them as speculative. Not the fact that they result from 
an expectation regarding the prices, since this permeates all types of operations 
performed in the contemporary fi nancial markets. (ibidem, p. 104)
Besides, the arbitrage concept should be included in the discussion. 
There are several modalities of arbitrage operations, whose objective lives 
in accomplishing capital gains, taking advantage of the distortions in the 
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relationships between prices. They consist basically of two opposite positions, 
involving the same asset in different temporalities, or the execution of the 
operation with different derivatives, in different fi nancial markets or with different 
assets with a real degree of correlation between the movements of their prices. 
The arbitrage operations have been accentuating the linkage between fi nancial 
markets. Through them, eventual dysfunctions in specifi c markets can spread 
quickly to other markets.
It is worth to emphasize that the derivatives markets linked to the 
exchange rates, which proliferated with the progress of fi nancial globalization, 
started to exercise a decisive infl uence on the process of price formation of the 
main exchange values negotiated at the global foreign exchange markets (dollar, 
mark / euro, yen, pound sterling, Swiss franc). This is due to the characteristics 
of those markets, especially the high volumes that are negotiated - and, hence, 
their higher liquidity relatively to the spot markets - as well as their transparency 
when negotiated at the organized markets. Such infl uence is also observed in 
some emerging economies, especially in Brazil, due to the existence of liquid 
and deep derivatives markets and to the high degree of fi nancial opening, which 
allows the foreign investors’ access to those markets, in addition to creating 
“communicating vessels” with the offshore foreign derivatives market. In the 
emerging economies that share those characteristics, the negotiations involving 
those fi nancial instruments play a fundamental role in the evolution of the 
nominal exchange rate. The arbitrage operations in time constitute the main 
mechanism of transmission between the future and the spot exchange rate. 
Through those operations, the banks and fund’s managers seek to obtain profi t 
from differences of very short term in the quotations of the currencies and their 
respective interest rates.
What we can, therefore, deduce from this discussion is that the companies, 
characteristically productive and increasingly fi nancial, saw a possibility of non-
operational gain with those instruments, beyond what would represent a hedge 
against the price volatility. That is, taking advantage of the high leverage allowed 
by the very existence of the derivatives, in which one can acquire, in the future, 
an asset that one does not want to receive, and sell an asset that is not possessed 
beforehand, the companies, in fact, were not restricted to the hedge, but, rather, 
speculated when they bet on a certain direction of the future behavior of an asset 
without any kind of coverage.
International Financial Crisis: the Financial Losses of 
Productive Companies
The deepening, in the second semester of 2008, of the international 
fi nancial crisis, after the bankruptcy of the American investment bank Lehman 
Brothers, provoked a strong appreciation of the dollar in face of the other 
currencies. However, such valorization was much more accentuated in the 
emerging economies. Directly hit by a new sudden stop of capital fl ows, the assets 
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prices and the exchange rates of those economies became important targets of the 
movement of global deleverage and of the investors’ “fl ight to quality.”
In this context, enormous fi nancial losses of important companies of 
emerging economies were revealed in positions in the foreign exchange derivatives 
markets.2 They had assumed positions in high amounts in those markets, betting 
that the national currency would not depreciate against the dollar. That decision 
was apparently made in the fi rst semester of 2008, a period in which the dollar 
suffered an intense depreciation in relation to a group of currencies, contributing 
for the strong increase in the commodities international prices, expressed in 
dollars. However, the deepening of the crisis generated strong decreases in the 
commodities prices and a new trend of international appreciation of the dollar. It 
was on that moment that the companies’ losses, caused by the speculative bets, 
came to the surface.
It should be noted that many of those companies were exporters, that is, 
those that suffer more intensely the impact of an appreciation of the exchange 
rate of their national currencies. From a microeconomic point of view, it was 
understandable that those companies looked for risk coverage against that 
appreciation. However, the amounts of their operations, much higher than the 
volumes of their exports, characterized their speculative posture and had, in the 
second semester of 2008, macroeconomic effects, among other reasons because 
they contributed to accentuate the depreciation of the exchange rate. A report of 
the bank HSBC (2009, p. 7) on Latin America expresses the extension and depth 
of that impact:
it wasn’t really until the corporate sector in Mexico, Brazil, and a few other 
Latin American countries forced a major weakening in currencies as a result 
of overleveraged currency derivatives in October that we all realized how truly 
global the crisis was going to be, with a depth and reach much beyond previous 
estimates.
In that case, the difference between hedge and speculation assumes a 
quantitative character: in this operation, the companies would be making hedge 
up to the supposed amount of their exports within that period, and would be 
speculating in the amount that exceeded such exports. The IMF report (2008), 
although emphasizing the use of the fi nancial derivatives such as hedge for 
the foreign exchange risk,3 also points out its speculative use, usually “out of 
balance”, referring to the losses incurred in by Brazilian and Mexican companies 
due to the depreciation of their domestic currencies.
In the case of the Brazilian companies, it is important to note that a 
number of those contracts were signed at the offshore over-the-counter market, 
and, consequently, it is not possible to evaluate their size and extension. The 
portion executed at the Brazilian market, in its turn, could have been performed 
in the Brazilian Mercantile and Futures Exchange (BM&F – Bolsa de Mercadorias 
e Futuros) or, in the case of operations in the over-the-counter market, should 
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have been registered in Cetip.4 Chart 1 clearly shows that the participation of 
the non-fi nancial legal entities in the future exchange market of BM&F has 
been quite scarce, which strengthens the hypothesis that the operations between 
companies and banks were, above all, performed in the over-the-counter market.
Source: Formulation based on data from BM&F.
Chart 1 – Position of the participants in the forward foreign exchange 
      market in US$ 50,000.00 contracts
As a matter of fact, due to peculiarities of the Brazilian legislation, 
the operations in the over-the-counter market have to be registered, and are, 
therefore, less opaque than in the international market. Prates & Farhi (2008) 
observe that the information of Cetip (Table 1) show the existence, in October 
29, 2008, of US$ 94 billion in positions of non-deliverable forward contracts 
between the market agents and their customers. The table also allows us to 
detect the existence of two periods of remarkable increase of the positions: the 
fi rst occurred in late 2005 and in 2006; the second began in late 2007, when 
the international fi nancial crisis had already emerged, and increased from August 
2008 on.
It is important to note that the data published by Cetip present two 
particularities. The fi rst is that, although the total amount of the operations is 
known, it is impossible to determine, based on those data, if each agent is long or 
short, and, therefore, to identify their liquid position. The second concerns the 
bigger complexity of the liquidation before the expiration of the operations of 
over-the-counter derivatives relatively to those performed in organized markets. 
Contrarily to the latter, in which it is enough to execute the opposite operation so 
that the original position is considered liquidated and ceases to appear in the open 
positions, the liquidations performed in over-the-counter markets usually involve 
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the execution of an identical operation to the original, but with “opposite signs.” 
Thus, those over-the-counter operations are registered twice, one regarding the 
original and the other regarding their liquidation in advance, until the expiration. 
The existent data do not allow us to estimate the proportion of those operations 
of advance liquidation.
Table 1 – Operations with foreign exchange derivatives in the 
      over-the-counter market
Non-deliverable forward contracts
Stock – United States Dollar
Market – Client
Date
Contracts
Financial Volume (US$)
03.30.2005 11,920,546,922.39
06.30.2005 11,474,767,753.79
09.30.2005 12,906,739,323.58
12.30.2005 20,132,756,958.96
03.31.2006 23,474,088,026.69
06.30.2006 28,776,493,602.94
09.29.2006 32,176,836,912.64
12.29.2006 30,076,180,458.56
03.30.2007 30,020,028,968.60
06.29.2007 37,509,893,619.81
09.28.2007 42,983,701,780.35
12.28.2007 48,944,903,336.69
03.31.2008 57,392,717,048.35
06.30.2008 54,072,843,514.46
09.30.2008 86,132,477,590.63
10.29.2008 94,715,855,151.75
Source: Cetip.
Table 2 displays the losses with derivatives, until October 14, 2008, 
associated to the the dollar appreciation, of some of the main companies from 
emerging economies. Many of them are Brazilian or Mexican. There are also 
those from China and Hong Kong. Several losses exceeded US$ 1 billion. It 
can be noticed that the branches of the listed fi rms are several, indicating that 
the use of derivatives instruments beyond the coverage of risks of exporter 
companies was generalized, that is, it characterized the behavior of corporations 
of different sectors. From Brazil, Aracruz, Votorantim Group, Sadia, and Vicunha 
Têxtil (which is not shown in the table) stand out, in addition to some close 
corporations of medium size, and to TAM.5
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One of the most severe cases was that of the Controladora Comercial 
Mexicana, the third largest retail chain of Mexico, which had to fi le for 
bankruptcy when it was unable to pay US$ 1.4 billion to the banks with which 
it had operated the contracts of derivatives. It is worth to emphasize that the 
Mexican bank market is dominated by great international fi nancial institutions, 
such as Citigroup, BBVA, Santander, HSBC, and Scotiabank. It is not just 
known for sure which of them sold the volatile derivatives to those companies 
(Randewich 2008). Also Mexican, conglomerates such as Cemex, Gruma, Alpha, 
and Vitro, reported signifi cant losses with foreign exchange derivatives, when they 
believed in the continuity of the valorization process of peso against dollar (cf. 
Thomson, 2008).
Table 2 – Losses of companies with derivatives associated to the dollar 
increase
Company Country Sector
Losses 
(US$ millions)
Citic Pacifi c Hong Kong Infrastructure -2,400
Controladora Comercial 
Mexicana
Mexico Retail -2,200
Aracruz Brazil Cellulose -2,130
Votorantim Group Brazil Diversifi ed -1,040
Cemex Mexico Cement    -711
Gruma Mexico Foods made of corn    -684
China Cosco Holdings Co. China Shipbuilding    -577
Air China Ltd. China Airline      -450*
Sadia Brazil Processed foods    -360
Alfa Mexico Diversifi ed    -273
Vitro Mexico Glass    -227
Source:  Formulation based on Regalado & Lyons (2008), Caminada & Price (2008), 
           Mavin (2008), Randewich (2008) and Diaz (2009).
* Losses associated to hedge contracts of fuel.
Note:   Not all losses are expressed in the table. Obviously, many companies are not 
 listed and some derivatives positions are pending.
Although not present in the table, countless companies of South 
Korea,6 such as PSM Inc. and Taesan LCD Co. - this one, by the way, fi led for 
bankruptcy in September 2008, following the losses resulting from its bets on 
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the Won -, incurred in losses when they operated the foreign exchange option 
denominated “knock-in knock-out” (KIKO), as a hedge or a speculative bet 
against the appreciation of the local currency in face of the dollar. That option, 
commonly used by South-Korean exporters, allowed the company to sell dollars 
at a fi xed exchange rate won / dollar, in case the Won oscillated within a range 
that was preset in the contract. However, if the value of the Won fell below the 
range, they were forced to sell dollars below the market rate, suffering enormous 
losses.7 Over 520 small and medium exporter companies that acquired KIKO 
options were close to insolvency. Many others could, during the fi rst semester of 
2009, have to face a similar situation, in case the weakening of the local currency 
did not revert and there was no capital injection into the companies’ funds (Jong-
Heon, 2008).
The losses of companies from emerging economies reached India as well. 
In that country, the losses were estimated, in March 2008, in US$ 3 billion 
to US$ 3.5 billion. The small and medium companies represented about 25% 
of that total. Examples of companies that suffered such losses are the Axis 
Bank (6.73 billion rupees), KPIT Cummins8 (893 million rupees) and Zee 
Entertainment (115 million rupees), mentioned by Business Standard (2008). It 
is also worth to point out that those Indian cases are previous to the deepening 
of the recent international fi nancial crisis, which occurred in the second 
semester of 2008.
Some Brazilian cases are worth of brief comments. Sadia, for instance, 
reported a non-recurrent loss, associated to derivatives instruments, of 777.4 
million Reais* in the third quarter of 2008. Most of the Sadia’s losses resulted 
from speculative operations with foreign exchange and a smaller portion was due 
to investments in Lehman Brothers’ securities (Barbieri, 2008a). The company’s 
short position in dollars reached US$ 8.4 billion. The portion of operations 
with a 12-month term that were liquidated in advance resulted in a loss of 544.5 
million Reais, and the total loss due to the crisis, registered in the third quarter 
was as high as 1.2 billion reais9 (Cruz & Valenti, 2008).
Aracruz, one of the Brazilian companies that were most exposed to 
the risk of the derivatives operations recorded losses of US$ 2.13 billion when 
liquidating 97% of its position.10 After the company’s proposal of paying out its 
debt in installments along 15 years, which was rejected by the group of creditor 
banks, among which are Itaú BBA, Santander, Merrill Lynch, JP Morgan, Citi, 
Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, Calyon, BNP Paribas, ING, and Barclays 
(Adachi, 2008b), and a round of negotiations, an agreement was signed. A nine-
year term was established for the payment in a system of increasing interest rates, 
in addition to a six-month grace period (Adachi, 2009).
The Votorantim Group’s losses of 2.2 billion Reais was also expressive, 
but lower than the one of Aracruz. The losses of Ajinomoto do Brasil, at the end 
of 2008, totaled 180 million Reais, in similar foreign exchange operations, of 
which 110 million Reais were related to “non-deliverable forward” (NDF) and 
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70 million Reais were due to debts in foreign currencies (Cunha, 2009). In a 
smaller proportion, Vicunha Têxtil reported losses, in September 2008, of about 
30 million Reais with derivatives transactions, essentially short positions in dollars 
(Lucchesi & Vieira, 2008).
In addition to the big companies, many medium fi rms have also 
succumbed to the appeal of fi nancial earnings that seemed to be so easy. In late 
October 2008, the director of Relationships with the Participants of Cetip, Jorge 
Sant’Anna, informed that there were over fi ve hundred companies involved in the 
foreign exchange derivatives. However, the exposure to the currency variation 
had been reduced, since, from September 30 to October 24, the short positions 
of the companies in dollars went from US$ 40 billion to US$ 20 billion for up 
to 90 further days (Chiarini, 2008). According to a survey conducted by Agência 
Estado (2008), regarding especially the fi rst semester of 2008, 37 of 50 non-
fi nancial companies of Ibovespa maintained open positions with derivatives. 
On what concerns the banks involved with such operations, Santander (with 60 
companies as customers), Unibanco (33 companies) and Itaú (96 companies) 
were mentioned. The contracts were focused, especially, on the modalities of 
target forward and swaps.
Most of the involved companies are not public traded corporations. 
Therefore, their losses are revealed only when they fi le lawsuits, disputing the 
legitimacy of the derivatives contracts signed with great fi nancial institutions. 
Two examples are Arantes Group and Tok & Stok, whose cases were disclosed 
following their appeal to the Judiciary. The losses of Arantes Group with 
the aforementioned operations were estimated in 200 to 250 million Reais. 
The diffi culties in refi nancing debts, resulting, above all, from restrictions to 
credit, impelled the company to fi le a request of judicial recovery estimated 
in approximately 1.5 billion Reais (A. Rocha, 2009). They also led the 
company to interrupt the payment of the due interests on its   bonds issued in 
the international market. Tok & Stok, in its turn, tried to avoid a loss of 55 
million Reais with Itaú BBA resulting from the foreign exchange derivatives 
contracts. The company alleged that the bank, based on the concession of 
fi nancings totaling 29.3 million Reais, set up derivatives operations that 
associated the loans to the reduction of the quotation of the dollar, in such 
a way that, if this quotation remained low, the company would pay lower 
interests than those of the market, and, in case it exceeded a value close to 
2 reais per dollar, the company would have to pay a much higher amount 
(Agência Estado, 2009).
Panel 1 shows synthetically how the basic operations involving the 
exporter companies were executed, without penetrating into the specifi cities of 
the complex contracts of fi nancial derivatives. It only reinforces the treatment 
given by the companies to the portion of their capital that is linked to exports. 
The inexistence of limits for the losses and the speculative character of the 
operations are reaffi rmed.
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS 23 (66), 2009 179
Panel 1 – The operation functioning
Mechanism
The exporter companies are benefi ted by a mechanism of fi nancing 
called Anticipation of Foreign Exchange Contracts  (Antecipação de 
Contratos de Câmbio – ACC), for which they receive the value of their 
exports, in Reais, in up to six months before doing them.
Discrepancy
The exporters apply that money and resources of their own funds in the 
fi nancial market to get compensation for an eventual foreign exchange 
discrepancy. Thus, even if the profi t with the exports decreases due to 
the valorization of the Real, the companies win in the fi nancial market 
and reduce their losses.
Protection
The companies use that mechanism to protect their exports, but they 
were operating beyond the values associated to those exports. In 
addition to that, some fi nancial operations did not have a limit of losses 
in case of a depreciation of the Real.
Losses
In practical terms, they bet that the Real value would continue to 
increase, but, with the oscillations in the currency caused by the 
fi nancial crisis, they suffered losses.
Source: D’Amorim (2008).
Prado (2008) discusses the risk that is inherent to foreign exchange 
derivatives operations, centering her analysis in the “principle of foreign exchange 
lock”, a kind of range within which the exchange rate can vary without causing 
losses to either party. With such mechanism, the losses for one of the parties 
would happen in case the exchange rate reached and exceeded the preset 
minimum or maximum. That seems to have happened to some companies that 
did not expect an abrupt and accentuated depreciation of the Real, when they 
locked their foreign exchange positions below 2 Reais per dollar.
Lucchesi et al. (2008) explore the kind of operation performed by 
companies such as Aracruz, denominated target forward, in which the company 
bets doubly in the valorization of the national currency - in this case, the Real -, 
assuming twice the short position in future dollars:
First, the company sells the dollar to the bank by means of an instrument called 
“forward”, or, abroad, “non-deliverable forward (NDF)”. It is the traditional 
dollar forward sale, by means of which the company sells dollars in one day in 
the future at a preset quotation. [...] the company also performs another coupled 
transaction: it sells the dollar again to the bank in the future and by means of a 
risky sale of call option. In that instrument, the bank pays a certain amount to 
the company in order to have the right of buying the dollar to a preset quotation 
in the future.
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In addition to that, the proposals of the banks to the companies for 
obtaining cheap credit involving the sale of dollar call options reached medium 
companies, including the real estate ones. “With the credit surplus, the dollar 
decreasing in value and the competition between banks becoming tougher and 
tougher, those products were offered by more and more banks to smaller and 
smaller companies” (Lucchesi et al., 2008).
Delfi m Netto (2008) complements the previous propositions affi rming 
that the companies signed contracts, whose main provisions were: “1) a notional 
value for the operation is established; 2) a reference value (‘strike’) of the 
exchange rate is established; 3) a term of validity is established (one to two years); 
and 4) there is a monthly accounting clearing.” In that model of hedge contract 
an asymmetry is identifi ed, which is pointed out by Delfi m:
if the value of the dollar is higher than the strike one, the difference is usually 
multiplied by two. There is no lock of the losses and the contract has to be 
executed until the end. Additionally, for 12 months, for instance, the monthly 
evaluation is made between a “spot” dollar that varies, versus a nominal reference 
dollar, whose difference favorable to the bank is multiplied by two, what makes 
very diffi cult for the company to get out of the operation. Even if the contract 
allows the exit by means of the bank itself, the loss for the customer is expressive 
and inevitable, given the structure and term of the operation. (ibidem)
It is not surprising, therefore, that judicial rebuttings appear alleging that 
the companies were deceived in the formulation of the contracts, although their 
fi nance departments have also been negligent in the identifi cation of the assumed 
risks, when they increasingly ventured in “unknown” fi nancial operations. That 
tends to result in agreements, lessening the profi ts and losses of both parties. 
Thus, the agreements become a favorable option, since the banks are facing the 
threat of not receiving the due values, and the companies often need loans and 
refi nancings from the banks, even for their productive activities, which drives 
them to try to avoid the default and, consequently, a confl icting situation, which 
could jeopardize their image in the attempt to obtain new resources (Carvalho & 
Ignacio, 2008b). Obviously, it will take time so that all of the legal procedures are 
complied with and the lawsuits are judged in all of the possible instances.
That demands a larger transparency in the operations, so that the 
regulatory monetary and fi nancial authorities acquire the necessary knowledge of 
what is happening and of the agents whose positions are “long” or “short”.11 As 
Lessa (2008) points out, “all those that have assets or debts in a foreign currency 
should register them in the Central Bank. We cannot go to sleep one night 
knowing that Sadia, Aracruz, Votorantim, and Vicunha are in a good situation, 
only to fi nd out, in the next morning, that they themselves do not know the 
extent of their losses.” Because of that, BNDES offered to help, together with the 
private banks, the companies that had suffered foreign exchange losses in fi nancial 
operations, once it considered them of great quality and wished to avoid liquidity 
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problems that would made them insolvent (Lage, 2008). The help, by means of 
a bridge loan, should benefi t about 200 companies, not just including the ones 
that had bet in the continuity of the valorization of the Real, but also others 
that, given the credit squeeze, needed capital to solve liquidity problems and to 
stabilize the cash fl ow (Moreira, 2008).
One cannot fail to mention also that, according to Audi & Robarts 
(2008), exporter companies such as Perdigão, JBS, Marfrig, and Minerva, 
although not engaged in speculative positions, presented losses regarding their 
debts in dollar, with the depreciation of the Real, although mitigated by their 
export incomes. Similarly, Cesp and Tractebel, whose refi nancing risks, mainly 
in moments of retraction of the liquidity, were greater, egistered losses resulting 
from the currency variation decurrent of their debts in dollar (Gaeta & Prado 
2008). As well as the others, Oi, which possessed debts of US$ 750 million 
exposed to the currency variation, with hedge, presented, in the third quarter of 
2008, a loss of 295 million Reais, although its net profi t kept positive (Folha de 
S.Paulo, 2008).
Those losses of Brazilian companies and from other emerging economies 
were announced in a period of magnifi cation of the international crisis and of a 
strong increase in the risk aversion. In that context, the macroeconomic impacts 
of those losses increased a lot. First, because they provoked a strong elevation 
in the volatility and depreciation of the national currencies, already suffering 
from the repercussions of the international crisis. Second, such losses started 
to constitute a credit risk, since the companies could fail to pay to the banks. 
As nobody knew accurately which companies and which banks were involved, 
that constituted an additional factor to the strong restriction of liquidity in the 
interbank operations and the accentuated reduction of the credit for fi rms in 
the emerging economies, even in those possessing a bank system that was not 
linked to the complex operations that resulted in the international fi nancial 
crisis. Third, a process of loss of trust in the companies was observed, due to 
their scarcely transparent operations performed in opaque markets. That meant a 
larger diffi culty in securing new loans or renewing old ones, not just because the 
companies that incurred in those losses with derivatives lost credibility with the 
banks for making “unknown” operations, but also because they endangered, in a 
great measure, their future profi ts, destined to the payment of those debts.
Final Considerations
Starting from the decades of 1970 and, especially, 1980, the processes of 
liberalization and deregulation of the fi nancial and foreign exchange markets were 
expanded, in national and international scale. That allowed the intensifi cation of 
the process of “fi nancialization” of the economy.12 Guttmann (2008, pp. 12-4) 
observes that such movement, within the scope of non-fi nancial institutions, is 
linked, especially, to the dominance of the logic of maximization of shareholder 
value. In this context, the priorities of the company are focused on the short-
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term results, to the detriment of long-term activities, which include, for instance, 
the productive investments. Thus, “great increases in the portfolios of fi nancial 
assets of non-fi nancial corporations” are observed, “with fi nancial incomes 
(interests, dividends, capital gains) becoming more important in the same 
measure.” However, obtaining short-term results is associated to more and more 
complex instruments, such as the several modalities of derivatives. Although 
the developments of those phenomena have allowed highly speculative and 
patrimonial gains (Tavares & Belluzzo, 2002, p. 153), the system became more 
unstable, subject to systemic risks, given the high degree of leverage, and to more 
frequent and intense fl uctuations in the assets prices.13
The relevance of the fi nances in the logic of the big corporations’ 
performance was not just accentuated by the movement of liberalization 
and deregulation of capital fl ows, but also by the very constitution of global 
networks of the transnational companies, operating in different markets and 
currencies. They started to participate in the fi nancial minuet, initially by means 
of operations in the different currency markets of the countries in which they 
operated and by means of hedge operations. Later, they sought to obtain a high 
non-operational profi t, using speculative instruments. This way, they became 
participants in the fi nancial sphere and managers of those assets, by means of 
the most diversifi ed mechanisms, aiming at executing patrimonial operations 
in search of capital gains, applications in fi nancial assets and/or fi nancings to 
companies that were linked to their conglomerate or network for developing 
technology. According to Braga (1997, p. 216),
as an imposition of the very competition and administration of risks, it is about 
constituting fi nances that do not only imply an appropriate debt structure, of 
liabilities (to immobilize capital), but at the same time building an appropriate 
creditor / active position in order to have mobility, fl exibility, innovative agility, 
and speed in the obtainment of lucrative opportunities in the several national, 
productive and fi nancial markets.
Thus, most of the big companies set up sophisticated fi nance departments 
capable of managing risks in the more differentiated assets, hedging them when 
the expectations of valorization are negative or maintaining them uncovered to 
take advantage of an eventual favorable evolution and, more and more frequently, 
assuming new risks in fi nancial investments and bets. That movement was 
not restricted, however, to the big corporations. Both companies of emerging 
economies and smaller ones in developed economies adopted the same style of 
fi nancial administration.
The recent fi nancial losses of productive companies emphasize the process 
of “fi nancialization” of their activities and the relevant role that speculation has 
acquired. The use of the derivatives as a form of protection had its proportions 
reduced in face of the expansion of their speculative use. With the international 
fi nancial crisis and the accentuated volatility of the assets prices, the mistaken 
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bets of corporations of the whole world, mainly of emerging economies, were 
evidenced by the fi nancial losses. It is important, in fact, to point out the role 
of the banks as counterparts of those positions, especially on what concerns 
the asymmetrical contractual aspects of those operations, susceptible of judicial 
inquiries by the companies.
Finally, as a result of all this, the State reappears in one of its most 
important attributions, namely that of maintaining the liquidity of the system, 
avoiding its rupture. Although the help, for its most part, is destined to fi nancial 
institutions, the fi nancial weaknesses of the companies exposed here demand 
the State intervention, in the sense of maintaining them productively capable 
and, consequently, avoiding still deeper cuts on jobs and income. Following 
the disaster that was induced by the “rationality of the agents” present in the 
theoretical outline of the effi cient markets, it is indispensable to rethink the 
regulatory mechanisms and the mechanisms of supervision, which proved 
themselves full of fl aws in the environment of deregulated fi nances.
*  Due to fl oating exchange rate, it is very diffi cult to translate with accuracy these amounts 
in American dollars. For comparison purposes, we can assume that, on average at that time, 
R$ 2 = US$ 1 [T.N.].
Notes
1  The authors thank Marcos Antonio Macedo Cintra for his attentive reading of the 
article and his enriching comments. The authors are accountable for any remaining 
misunderstanding.
2  From a given moment on, the public traded companies had to disclose their losses. Since 
the operations are usually “out of balance”, they are very little transparent. Even in the 
cases of public traded companies, whose fi nancial demonstrations are published, the 
control and the normative structure required to disclose the results of such operations 
were nonexistent. After the disclosure of those losses, new accounting rules were adopted 
in Brazil, in accordance with the recommendations of the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários 
- CVM (Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission), among which the one that 
deals with the fi nancial instruments stands out; such instruments include from the exotic 
derivatives to any receivables (Valenti, 2009). Under the new rule, issued in December 
2008, the disclosure of the table of sensitivity analysis in three different scenarios, which 
used to be optional, as in the balance of the third quarter, became mandatory, in the 
annual balance of 2008 (Valenti & Fregoni, 2009).
3  “One important way fi rms may have cut the exposure to currency risk has been the 
growing reliance on fi nancial derivatives to hedge currency risk” (IMF, 2008, p. 55).
4  Created by the fi nancial institutions and the Central Bank, Cetip S.A. – Balcão 
Organizado de Ativos e Derivativos (Organized Counter of Assets and Derivatives) - 
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began its operations in 1986. It is an association for the administration of organized 
over-the-counter markets, that is, of environments for negotiation and registration of 
securities, public and private bonds of fi xed income and over-the-counter derivatives.
5  Differently of most companies, TAM registered a fi nancial loss in the third quarter of 
2008 of 301.5 million Reais, of which 268.3 million corresponded to losses with fuel 
hedge. The company “had protected 50% of its consumption of fuel at US$ 110 per 
barrel of oil, but the quotation of the input in the quarter closed at US$ 104” (Campassi, 
2008).
6  J. Rocha (2009) mentions the decision of the judicial court of the district of Seoul, 
in South Korea, which decided to annul the foreign exchange derivatives contracts of 
two exporter companies of the country - DS LCD and MonAmi - with the Standard 
Chartered Bank, observing the asymmetry present in the contractual relationship 
between the bank and the companies and the fact that “such contracts are demandable, 
in their liquidation, as long as such currency variations are processed within a reasonable 
spectrum, something which will not have happened with the violent leverage of the 
dollar.”
7  Other characteristics of the knock-in and knock-out options can be found in Santos 
(1998). In general, they are denominated barrier options, which come to existence or 
cease to exist if the strike price of the object reaches a certain value - the barrier.
8  It is intriguing to detect, in the company’s website, a qualitative reference to Lehman 
Brothers, as witness of a model of (little) exemplary business. “A relationship-based and 
vertical focused business model (Focus on two verticals: Manufacturing & Diversifi ed 
Financial Services) has helped us grow at a fast pace with top line revenue growth of 
10x and increase in market capitalization of 15x over the last 5 years. Our 95 plus active 
global clients and strategic partnerships with some of the largest & renowned players 
in their respective areas, Cummins & Cargill (Manufacturing) and Lehman Brothers 
(Financial Services), are a testimony to our business model” (Available in <http://www.
kpitcummins.com/corporate/profi le.htm>. Access in: Dec. 28, 2008).
9  It is worth to point out that, on September 30, 2008, after having liquidated a signifi cant 
portion of its positions, Sadia still presented a short position in dollars to the amount 
of US$ 6.37 billion. Since the company possessed a hedge equivalent to US$ 4 billion, 
its short liquid position was of US$ 2.37 billion, although the long positions were of a 
shorter term, needing constant renewal and signaling the hedge imperfection (Adachi, 
2008a). In December 2008, the foreign exchange exposure of the company with pending 
contracts decreased to US$ 678 million, which were equivalent to less than three months 
of export (Barbieri, 2008b).
10 On October 9, 2008, the credit rating of the company was lowered from BBB to BB+ by 
the risk rating agency Fitch, below the level of investment grade (Reis et al., 2008). It 
is worth to point out, however, that after the events that were evidenced by the current 
crisis, the credibility of those risk rating agencies already deteriorated signifi cantly.
11 In that sense, the possibility of creation of a center of derivatives risk until the end of the 
year is already being studied. The project appeared in the subcommittee of derivatives 
created under the committee of treasury of the Brazilian Federation of Banks (Febraban 
– Federação Brasileira de Bancos). Cetip and some banks also participate in the plan, 
in addition to the National Association of Institutions of the Finance Market (Andima 
- Associação Nacional das Instituições do Mercado Financeiro), the Central Bank and 
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CVM. According to the director of relationships with participants of Cetip, Jorge 
Sant’Anna, the objective of the derivatives center would be to disclose information about 
the companies’ negotiations with derivatives, in such a way that the participants of the 
market could evaluate the consolidated risks (Pavini & Carvalho, 2009).
12 For a critical approach to the fi nancial globalization and its implications, see Chesnais 
(1998).
13 Guttmann (2008, pp. 15-6) points out those very aspects when discussing the avalanche 
of fi nancial innovations that were created in the markets. “Key innovations, in spite 
of providing the general credit system with fl exibility and capacity of reaction to the 
creditors’ and debtors’ needs, also stimulated the asset bubbles, the underestimation of 
risks and the excessive leverage.”
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ABSTRACT – As a consequence of the deepening of the international fi nancial crisis during 
the second semester of 2008, several productive companies from emerging economies have 
registered enormous losses in the foreign exchange derivatives markets. This fact points to 
the speculative dynamics of corporations in the fi nancial deregulated environment. This 
paper aims to articulate this logic of enterprises’ behavior with the crisis and to discuss some 
macroeconomic effects resulting from the fi nancial losses caused by speculative bets in the 
derivatives markets.
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